Participant Interests

Participant Interests

Charles Bennett

I am interested in learning about the paradoxes of measure and observership, whether they can be mitigated by a less experiential and more algorithmic-informational definition of the observer, and whether a finite amount of fine tuning suffices to generate unboundedly growing complexity in the sense of logical depth. In the theory of fault-tolerant computation, stochastic models with finite fine tuning (i.e. having positive measure in the parameter space of their initial conditions and local transition probabilities) have been shown (cf. Gacs arXiv:math/0003117) to be "self-organizing" in low-dimensional Euclidean space, producing structures that are complex almost everywhere, instead of merely infinitely often as Boltzmann imagined. Can analogous phenomena occur in the non-Euclidean manifolds relevant to cosmology?

Sean Carroll

What I'd like to like to hear most from others is quite vague and general:

James Hartle

In no particular order I would like to hear:

Stefan Leichenauer

Questions for the group:

Ken Olum

The things I would most like to hear about, in 5 words each, are: "Can we live without anthropics?" and "Can we live with anthropics?".

Don Page

Here are some questions and subjects I would be interested in: [Further details].

Jess Riedel

With regards to self-locating uncertainty: More narrowly, and towards my own work, I am interested to what extent the requirement of redundant records might produce the wrong branch structure:

Mark Srednicki

What I would most like to hear about: What is the criterion for "instantiation" of an event in a quantum system?

Consider a system in a state |psi>. We then apply a time-ordered sequence of projectors P_{a_i}(t_i) corresponding to some observable(s) being in some range at each time. We then compute the norm of the projected state. Many physicists (generally anyone not steeped in quantum foundations) will say that this norm gives the probability that this sequence of observables "happened"; that the system has this probability to have "experienced" this history. On the other hand, many coming to this conference would say that this is only true if this history is part of a decohering set.

Which is right (if either), and why? Is this even a scientific question that can, in principle, be decided? Or is it stuck in the murk of interpretation?